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PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS
by Julian R. Birnbaum"
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins1 is generally considered to be the one

employment decision of the 1988-89 Term which is favorable to plaintiffs.
The case provides helpful authority to employees claiming discrimination
in "pretext"2 cases. In "mixed-motive"3 cases, the Court ruled the burden
of persuasion shifts from employee to employer.4 This article focuses on
the potential effect of the decision on subsequent employment
discrimination cases. The first section is comprised of a general overview
of the principles stated in Price Waterhouse that will be important to future
plaintiffs. The second section discusses the unanswered questions left by
the Price Waterhouse analysis; and the final section illustrates, by reference
to the case on remand, the nature of the burden once it has shifted.
I.

GENERAL OVERVIEW

Price Waterhouse states several principles of general importance to

employment discrimination plaintiffs.

First, the "critical inquiry"

Partner, Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P.C., New York, New York. A.B.
1970, Harvard College; J.D. 1975, University of Chicago Law School. The author
represents plaintiffs in employment discrimination and employee rights cases.
1. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
2. A pretext case, analyzed under the framework set forth in Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), occurs where an adverse employment decision stems from a
single source, Le., where "eithera legitimate or an illegitimate set of considerations led to
the challenged decision." Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1789 (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) (emphasis in original). The question asked by Burdine, in determining whether
the plaintiff has met her burden of persuasion, is whether the illegitimate discriminatory
reason is the true motivation rather than the legitimate reason asserted by the employer.
Id. at 1788-89. See generallyBurdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56.
3. A mixed-motive case, like Price Waterhouse, occurs when both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations play a part in the challenged decision. Price Waterhouse, 109
S. Ct. at 1788 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). In considering Hopkins' bid for partnership,
Price Waterhouse legitimately took into account her problems with interpersonal relations,
but illegitimately considered that she should take "a course at charm school.. . [and] walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry." Id. at 1782.
4. Price Waterhouse holds that where a plaintiff shows that an illegitimate
discriminatory factor played a motivating or substantial part in an adverse decision, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of the unlawful motive. Id. at 1790.
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commanded by title VII's "because of' language is whether the
discriminatory motive was a factor in the employment decision "at the
moment it was made."6 Thus, a plaintiff does not have to "identify the
precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations....,
Further, a plaintiff who fails to satisfy the fact-finder through direct
evidence that an impermissible factor influenced the decision may still
prevail under the circumstantial Burdine analysis by showing the employer's
asserted reason is pretextual. 8 Conversely, a mixed-motive analysis
provides a plaintiff a way to recover even if she is not able to convince the
fact-finder of pretext, as long as she presents sufficient credible evidence
of an illegal factor's influence.' Once such evidence of reliance on illegal
factors is presented, the plaintiff is not required to establish the negative
proposition that she would not have been adversely treated had she been
a man."0 Finally, the Price Waterhouse opinion focuses on the effect that
discriminatory remarks and attitudes, displayed by decisionmakers and
nondecisionmakers alike, have on the final employment decision."

II.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Price Waterhouse leaves unresolved three major issues that have
always challenged plaintiffs in proving employment discrimination. First,
what type of evidence must the plaintiff provide to the court to show that
her employer relied on an impermissible, illegal factor in reaching the
contested decision, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant? In other words, what will be necessary to establish a mixed5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) ("It shall be... unlawful... for an employer...
to discriminate against any individual... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin .... .") (emphasis added).
6. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis in
original).

7. Id. at 1786.
8.
Court
under
stated

Id. at 1788, 1789 n.12; id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Burdine, the
held that even after a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination
title VII, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that its
legitimate reason for the employment decision was the true reason. Burdine, 450

U.S. at 254.
9. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1788-89 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
10. Rather, it is the employer's duty to establish that plaintiff would have been treated
the same regardless of the factors in the decision. Id. at 1789.
11. Remarks of nondecisionmakers, which Justice O'Connor would not consider to be
direct evidence, may be shown to have played a critical role in the making of a decision and
to have influenced decisionmakers. Id. at 1791, 1794. See also id. at 1804 (O'Connor,
I., concurring).
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motive case? After Price Waterhouse, plaintiffs will most likely be required
to prove the existence of impermissible factors by direct evidence.12 Such
evidence will be subject to a narrow definition as Justice O'Connor's
concurrence shows. 3 From her opinion one can begin to determine what
evidence will not be considered direct: stray remarks in the workplace,
statements by nondecisionmakers, statements by decisionmakers unrelated
to the decisionmaking process and expert testimony that sex-stereotyping
influenced the process.' 4 Circuit courts'5 as well as district courts 6
If the
have already restricted the concept of direct evidence.
discriminatory remarks made in the workplace do not rise to the level of
direct evidence, however, these remarks may still be considered as evidence
that discriminatory factors played a role in the employer's final decision."7
12. Justice O'Connor specifically required direct evidence as a threshold for shifting
the burden. Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904
F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th Cir. 1990); Holland v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 1307,
1313 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989) (direct evidence that an impermissible factor influenced the
decision is necessary to apply the Price Waterhouse analysis); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l
Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989).
The plurality declined to limit possible ways to prove that sex stereotyping played
a motivating role, or to decide what facts would establish plaintiff's case, thus leaving open
the question of whether something less than direct evidence would be sufficient. Price
Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). The plurality's opinion
did require, however, that a plaintiff show the employer "actually relied on her gender in
making its decision." Id. The evidence before the Court was direct, consisting of sexstereotyped comments made by partners about Ms. Hopkins which were considered by
This was not "discrimination in the air" but was
defendant's decisionmakers.
"discrimination brought to the ground and visited upon" Hopkins. Id.
13. Id. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1804-05. Compare Pierce-Tudela v. City of Minneapolis, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1065, 1071 (D. Minn. 1990) with Sobel v. Leeds Northrup Co., 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12272, 9-10 (N.D. Ill.).
15. See, e.g., Young v. City of Houston, Tex., 906 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1990)
(employer's references to "white tokens" and "white faggots" are stray remarks insufficient
to shift burden to employer); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 467 (1st Cir. 1990)
(dean's statement that quotas would have to be imposed to get more women on faculty
was not direct evidence of discriminatory animus); Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications,
Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1989) (evidence of statements must show that
discriminatory intent is related to the specific employment decision at issue, and the
discriminatory remarks must be shown to have played a part in the decision).
16. See, e.g., Dunning v. National Indus., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1475,147879 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (remarks must show more than callousness or indifference; they
must show intent to treat differently). Cf Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems.,.Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (employer's statements found to constitute direct

evidence).
17. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
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Second, how great a role must the impermissible factors play in an
adverse decision so that the burden of persuasion is then shifted to the
employer? Although the plurality opinion leaves open the possibility that
something less than "but for" causation may establish liability,' it remains
clear that the impermissible factor must do more than simply "taint" the
decision. 9 The proposition that the impermissible factor must in fact
make a difference in the outcome is certainly stronger after Price
Waterhouse. For example, the court stated in Brown v. Trustees of Boston
University that "a 'tainted' decision is not necessarily one that would
have been different 'but for' the taint."2'
Price Waterhouse offers two formulations to test the extent to
which an adverse decision must in fact be influenced by an impermissible
factor in order to shift the burden. The first, stated by the plurality, is
whether the impermissible reason was a "motivating" factor; that is, was the
impermissible factor one reason out of several upon which the employer
relied.' The second formulation, adopted by the concurrence, is whether
18. Justice Brennan read the words "because of' in title VII as not meaning "solely
because of' and not obligating "a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by
legitimate and illegitimate motivations'; she is only obligated to prove "that the employer
relied upon sex-based considerations in coming to its decision.' Id. at 1786. Although this
rejects a requirement that the plaintiffs prove "but for" causation, Brennan's analysis
implicitly adopts "but for" as a final determinant of liability since the employer must
eventually prove that the illegitimate motive was not the "but for" cause of its decision. Id.
at 1788 n.11, 1790. Justice O'Connor, concurring, id. at 1807, and Justice Kennedy,
dissenting, id. at 1807, however, read "because of' to mean "but for." Cf Brown v.
Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 352 n.13 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court raised, but did
not consider, whether Price Waterhouse permits a pretext plaintiff to prevail by proving
'something less than 'but for' causation'); Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assoc., Inc., 50 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 803, 805 (N.D. I11.1989) (the court described plaintiff's burden
as having to show the improper factor was a substantial motivation for the decision but not
having to show "but for" causation); Coleman v. Manufacturers Hanover Corp., 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13537, 4 (E.D. Pa.) (the court agreed that Price Waterhouse "casts serious
doubt on the application of any 'but for' causation test in employment cases').
19. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1786 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at
1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989).
21. Id. at 353 (footnote omitted).
22. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). "In
saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if
we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee
was a woman." Id. at 1790 (footnote omitted).
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the impermissible factor was a "substantial" one in the final decision.'
Similar to the prior differing judicial interpretations of the standard of
causation for title VII liability,2 the Justices disagreed within the opinions
about whether these two formulations are really different.' Subsequent
cases continue to use the differing descriptions of the motivation needed
to shift the burden. 2'
Third, what evidence must an employer, in order to avoid liability,
produce to show that the same decision would have been reached even
23. Id. at 1794 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Once
the plaintiff has come forward with direct evidence that an illegitimate motive played "a
significant, though unquantifiable, role," she has justified shifting the burden of persuasion
to the employer. Id. at 1802 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461
(D.C. Cir. 1987)).
At this point Ann Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it
could go ....
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside
the room where partnership decisions were being made. As the
partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard several of them
them [sic] make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for
partnership. As the decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by
one of those privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was
a major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid.
Id. (emphasis in original). Requiring the plaintiff additionally "to prove that any one factor
was the definitive cause of the decisionmakers' action may be tantamount to declaring Title
VII inapplicable to such decisions." Id. at 1803 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 1784 n.2 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
25. Justice Brennan did not see these as meaningfully different standards, id at 1790
n.13, while Justice O'Connor said it was obvious that her proposed standard differed
"substantially" as a result of her analysis of the meaning of the statutory words "because of."
Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. There are several possibilities. A court can adopt the "substantial" test. See
Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990); Veatch v. Northwestern
Memorial Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 809, 816 (N.D. Il1.1990); Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. Baker, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1990). It may adopt the "motivating" test by reading the
concurrence as proposing the same test, as in Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d
1434, 1437 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990), and Thomas v. Digital Equip. Corp., 880 F.2d 1486, 1489
(1st Cir. 1989). It may hold that either a "motivating or substantial role" is enough to shift
the burden, as in Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir.
1989); see also Kelly v. City of Leesville, 897 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1990). It may adopt
an unadorned "motivating factor" test, as in Zanders v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 898
F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990), and Nichols v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 712 F. Supp. 488, 493
(E.D. Pa. 1989). It may require a plaintiff to show only that the "employment decision at
issue was based upon an impermissible factor." Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications,
Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1989). Or it may require the plaintiff to prove only that
"an employer considered a factor prohibited by Title VII" in its decision. Chaffin v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269, 1274 (8th Cir. 1990).

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VII

without reliance on impermissible factors? PriceWaterhouse holds that the
employer need only prove that the same decision would have been reached
by a preponderance of the evidence, and not by clear and convincing
evidence as the plaintiff contended. 27 To this end, the employer's
evidence must be objective, at least in part; the evidence must show that
the same decision would have been made, not just that the same decision
would have been justified.2' Further, the evidence must show more than
that a legitimate reason is present, but that such reason alone would have
induced the decision."' Despite the suggestion to the contrary by Justice
White, ' the fact-finder should not give any special credence to the
employer's argument on this issue, since the employer's testimony
pertaining to the absence of an illegal motive has not previously been
found to be credible.3
III.

THE SHIFTED BURDEN
The proceedings on remand in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse" show

that when the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer, the employer
will face problems of proof normally encountered by the plaintiff.33 At
trial, Ms. Hopkins had not been able to determine the precise effect
stereotyping had in the decision.' "It was apparent from the testimony
that disentangling stereotyping from fact is difficult. Stereotyping may be
conscious or unconscious, and a negative fact may be expressed in words
that imply stereotyping and yet may be wholly nondiscriminatory."3 Price
Waterhouse's burden to avoid liability, however, was precisely to
disentangle the "subtle influence of sex upon a person's perceptions "' in
order to "separate out those comments tainted by sexism from those free
27. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792-93 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at
1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 1791 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
29. Id. at 1791-92.
30. Id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 1791 n.14 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). Although the employer has not
yet been proven a violator of title VII by a showing that an illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor in its decision, "neither is it entitled to the same presumption of good
faith concerning its employment decisions which is accorded employers facing only
circumstantial evidence of discrimination.' Id. at 1798-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C. 1990).
33. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
34. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1206.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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of sexism"3" by addressing the "extent to which the perceptions of
[plaintiff's] interpersonal skills were tainted by sexism. "' Because the
employer's conduct wrongly created the "risk that the interference of illegal
and legal motives cannot be separated,"39 the employer must take the
"strong medicine of requiring [it] to bear the burden of persuasion on the
issue of causation .... 40
On remand, however, Price Waterhouse was unable to prove that
Ms. Hopkins' partnership candidacy would still have been put on hold even
in the absence of sexually biased evaluations. 1
Similarly, Price
Waterhouse neither identified sexually stereotyped comments 42 nor
demonstrated what weight those comments had on the contested
decision. 3 Further, Price Waterhouse did not provide guidance for
differentiating between comments influenced by sexual stereotyping and
comments not so influenced." Instead, it relied upon criticisms of the
plaintiff's inadequate interpersonal skills but did not show that these
remarks did not reflect "male-dominated standards governing how women
were supposed to behave."45 Price Waterhouse also relied on the district
court's statement in its original opinion that because of plaintiff's
interpersonal problems, the court had been unable to determine whether
she would have been elected partner in an untainted process. 4 Neither
of these contentions was sufficient to meet the shifted burden of persuasion.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1206 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1790).
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1206.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1207.

46. Id. at 1206.
47. Id. at 1206-07. See also Richardson v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 729 F. Supp.
806 (M.D. Ala. 1989), in which the court rejected defendant's contention that it would not
have renewed a teacher's contract even if she passed the state teacher certification test.
The school board failed to present evidence comparing the plaintiff's experience and
observed ability with those of teachers holding certificates who had been rehired. It failed
to show why the plaintiff, "if she had passed the state certification test, would not have
been employed instead of . . . one of those [teachers] with less experience than

Richardson.' Id. at 814. See also Singletary v.Lane, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1283, 48-49
(N.D. Ill.) (it was not sufficient for the employer to show that other black and white
employees, whose actions were comparable to the black plaintiffs, had not suffered punitive
action; the defendant was required to show that it had taken punitive action against those
comparable employees).
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CONCLUSION

After Price Waterhouse, plaintiffs' lawyers should proceed much as
they have previously. It is not necessary to characterize a particular case
as either "pretext" or "mixed-motive" at the outset of litigation, 4 nor even
at the summary judgment stage. 9 Plaintiffs' lawyers should, as before,
present all direct and indirect evidence of a discriminatory motive, ° since
their ultimate goal is to persuade the fact-finder that discrimination was
the one true reason, or at least a motivating or substantial reason, for the
contested decision.
If reliance by the employer on an impermissible factor cannot be
shown by direct evidence, the plaintiff may prevail only by showing pretext
under Burdine.1 If the court believes either the plaintiff's reason or the
defendant's reason, the Burdine pretext analysis will be dispositive 2 If,
however, the court believes that both the reasons advanced by the parties
were motivating factors behind the employer's decision, the burden shifts
to the employer under Price Waterhouse.53 In the latter scenario, a
plaintiff operating under the Burdine framework would have lost because
of a failure to prove pretext. 4 Under Price Waterhouse, though, the
plaintiff will have made a sufficient showing to require the court to order
the defendant employer to disentangle its motivations by proving it would
have made the same decision regardless of the impermissible factors.
Thus, Ms. Hopkins has in effect given future plaintiffs an additional means
to redress employment discrimination.
48. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1789 n.12 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
49. Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 481 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989).
50. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1789 n.12 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). See, e.g., Summers v.
Communication Channels, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-40 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
52. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1789 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
53. Id.
54. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

